Mission Log: [UNDISCLOSED] Regional Utility Provider/ Energy & Critical Infrastructure
Project FORTRESS: National Grid Hardening
Tactical Interventions
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NIS2 Compliance
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Supply Chain Audit
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Network Segmentation
Mission Impact
100% Audit Pass
Compliance
12 High-Risk
Vendors Removed
Purdue Level 3.5
Architecture
MISSION REPORT: OPERATION FORTRESS
Target Entity: Power Distribution Network (Regional Utility)
Regulatory Context: NIS2 Directive & National Cyber Perimeter
Risk: License Revocation & Kinetic Sabotage
The Strategic Context
A regional energy provider responsible for powering 2 million homes had grown through rapid M&A. This resulted in a "Frankenstein Network"—a chaotic, flat infrastructure where a malware infection in the HR department's printer could theoretically propagate to the high-voltage substation controllers.
National Cyber Authorities (CSIRT) issued a "Corrective Order" following a failed audit. The Utility had 6 months to overhaul their defense or face license revocation and the removal of the Board of Directors for negligence.
The Intervention: Regulatory Remediation
Intarmour acted as the Regulatory Remediation Task Force. We did not aim for "Best Effort"; we aimed for "Military Standard."
Phase 1: The Purdue Model Implementation We executed a "Scorched Earth" redesign of the network topology. We physically and logically separated the network into strict zones:
- Level 4 (Enterprise): Finance, HR, Email (Internet connected).
- Level 3.5 (DMZ): The Industrial DMZ - the only bridge between worlds, heavily firewalled.
- Level 0-3 (Operations): The Grid Control (Air-Gapped logic). This ensures that a ransomware attack on the office cannot "jump" to the grid.
Phase 2: Supply Chain Purge We audited every vendor with remote access rights. We discovered a maintenance vendor using TeamViewer with a shared password ("Pass1234") to access critical turbines. We terminated the connection immediately. We deployed a Secure Remote Access (SRA) portal requiring biometric Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and session recording for all vendors.
Phase 3: The "Golden Power" Cleanup We identified three critical software components in the SCADA network that were sourced from high-risk geopolitical jurisdictions (non-NATO). We managed the migration to sovereign, approved alternatives, aligning the stack with national security standards.
The Operational Outcome
- Audit Success: The regulator re-inspected the facility and passed it with "Commendation" status. The license was renewed for 5 years.
- Resilience Proven: Two months post-project, a commodity ransomware hit the utility's office network (via a phishing email). The office PCs were encrypted, but the Grid operations continued without a flicker. The DMZ firewall held.
Strategic Lesson: Compliance is not just paperwork; it is the blueprint for survival.
Threat Profile
"A regional energy provider was flagged by national authorities as non-compliant with the new Cyber Perimeter laws. They had 6 months to overhaul their defense or face license revocation. Their network was a flat, unsegmented mess connecting office Wi-Fi to power substations."
Countermeasures
Intarmour executed a 'Scorch Earth' redesign. We implemented the Purdue Model of segmentation, creating a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between IT and OT. We audited 50+ vendors and cut off access to 12 non-compliant maintenance providers.